Most of what you read about the crash of Korean Air 2033 on August 10, 1994 is based on early news reports that were little more than speculation: the first officer called for a go around but the captain refused. The story was too good to pass up, so more and more news was based on these faulty reports. And here we are, thirty years later, and we have new stories based on the old speculation. I believe most of these stories are just wrong. There are lessons to be learned here, but not the lessons you get from most of these sources.
— James Albright
Updated:
2026-02-14
HL 7296, from Aviation Safety Network
There are several sources on the Internet that claim the Korean first officer called for a go around prior to the landing and the Canadian captain refused. The normally reliable www.tailstrike.com has a "transcript of the Cockpit Voice Recorder" that includes the following line: "At this moment, the Co-pilot decides that there is insufficient distance for the Airbus to land safely without crossing the end of the runway. The Co-pilot, when the aircraft is only 30 feet off the ground, decides to "go around" and pulls back on the yoke." Wikipedia shows a "Cockpit voice recorder transcript" that says the copilot said "Go around" at 100 feet. I cannot find any primary source that backs any of this up.
When I first read these reports I was suspicious because the scenario goes against previous Korean Air crashes and the culture at the airline. At the time, the authority gradient between captains and first officers was quite steep. First officers in many cases sat humbly, knowing they were about to die. The reported CVR transcripts ran contrary to the airline's history. Parts of the report are available but they are written in Korean. I've had the report translated and it includes only CVR excerpts. What is printed doesn't show that the first officer called for a go around against the captain's wishes, only that after touchdown he mistook something the captain said as directing him to go around.
- Date: 10 AUG 1994
- Time: 11:22 LT
- Type: Airbus A300B4-622R
- Operator: Korean Air
- Registration: HL7296
- Crew: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 8
- Passengers: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 152
- Total: Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 160
- Airplane fate: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
- Location: Cheju Airport (CJU) (South Korea)
- Phase: Landing (LDG)
- Nature: Domestic Scheduled Passenger
- Departure airport: Seoul-Gimpo (Kimpo) International Airport (SEL/RKSS), South Korea
- Destination airport: Jeju (Cheju) International Airport (CJU/RKPC), South Korea
1
The crew
Korean Air has through the years employed foreign nationals as captains, at first just because they needed the expertise and later because other nations threatened to refuse their airspace until the airlines of Korea improved their safety record. The U.S., for example, did just that in 2001. More about that: The Airlines of Korea.
The captain of Flight 2033 was a 53 year-old Canadian national who didn't speak Korean. It appears he had 13,207 total flight hours, of which 2,758 were in type. The first officer was a 36 year-old Korean who was said to have poor English skills. It appears he had 3,195 total flight hours, of which 316 were in type.
2
What we know happened
Piecing together what happened from the Accident Report, requires "reading between the lines," which I suppose is where much of the speculation comes from. What follows is what is in the translated report and where I need to speculate, I'll do so explicitly.
The flight was a scheduled domestic trip from Seoul (Gimpo International Airport) to Jeju Airport on an Airbus A300. On board were the 2 pilots, 7 cabin crewmembers, and 152 passengers.
The weather included heavy rain and reports of windshear. The winds were 140° / 18 to 25 knots. Runway 06 was in use and was wet.
The crew opted for a lesser flap setting (15 versus 20), because of the possibility of windshear.
The CVR indicates that the first officer made a comment about the excessive speed before touchdown and the captain replied "Okay, I know."
The FDR shows that the aircraft crossed the runway threshold high and fast. They crossed at 185 kts, their planned approach speed was 160 knots, VREF was 147 kts.
At 11:21:02, the captain said, "Get off."
At 11:21:32, the First Officer misunderstood the Captain’s statement “Get off” and confirmed it as “Go Around?” The Captain responded “Yes.”
Why did the captain say "get off" at that moment, just prior to or during the flare? The captain was an English-speaking Canadian and I believe what might have been happening was the captain had his hands full with the gusty winds and believed the first officer's hands were on the yoke and directed him to "get off" the controls.
The aircraft floated during the flare and touched down 1,773 meters (5,816 ft.) from the threshold. The runway was 3,000 meters (9,843 ft.) long.
Thrust reversers were deployed 1.2 seconds after touchdown and manual braking was applied.
The aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining runway distance, departed the runway end, and collided with an airport perimeter embankment. A post-impact fire occurred.
There is no doubt the approach was unstable and that Crew Resource Management could have been better. But there is also little doubt that the concept of stable approaches and CRM were not as widely taught and understood at Korean Air back in 1994. (Again, refer to: The Airlines of Korea for evidence of this.
4
The lessons
The probable cause section of the report:
The accident was caused by the captain's excessive approach speed and improper landing technique in deteriorating weather conditions, combined with inadequate crew coordination and failure to adhere to stabilized approach criteria, resulting in a runway overrun. Contributing factors were windshear and heavy rain, improper flap configuration, failure to execute a timely go around, inadequate callout procedures, and CRM deficiencies.
Recommendations included: Strengthening CRM training, Reinforcement of stabilized approach criteria, Standardization of callout procedures, Improved English proficiency training, Enhanced simulator training, Installation of wind shear detection equipment, and Revisions to operational manuals.
In my view, mixing a highly experienced captain with a first officer with very little experience can only work if the captain is a patient instructor and the first officer is confident and willing to speak up. But a prerequisite to success is that both pilots are proficient in the same language. The report's recommendations provide a good list of lessons, but could go further:
Standard Operating Procedures in the form of proper checklist usage, call outs, and stable approach criteria empower the pilot monitoring to speak up and depersonalize corrections so that captains can realize they aren't being personally challenged by the younger pilot, only called on to adhere to a higher standard.
Landing performance needs to be considered prior to every landing, to include the impact of landing flap selection in view of the winds and runway contamination. Knowing you will need three-quarters of the runway should be adequate motivation to not salvage a landing halfway down the runway.
Rejecting a landing after touchdown and thrust reverser deployment is rarely a good idea.
Pilots must have a common language. A successful strategy employed by some airlines flying culturally mixed crews is to have a definite list of vocabulary and phrases that covers all normal and anticipated non-normal situations.
References
(Source material)
항공기 사고조사보고, 대한항공 A300-600, HL7296, November 1994, Ministry of Transportation (Republic of Korea)