Runway Incursions / Excursions

I've had one runway incursion and have come close to one excursion. The first was caught by the tower and was embarrassing. The second seemed more dramatic than it was but probably started me on a path to a full head of gray hair. I'll get into both, briefly cover a few more significant examples, and then provide a few recognized avoidance procedures and add a few techniques of my own.

1 — Runway incursion: a personal tale

2 — Runway incursions: a few examples of how badly things can go

3 — Runway incursions: recognized avoidance procedures

4 — Runway incursions: a few avoidance techniques

5 — Runway excursion (almost?): a personal tale

6 — Runway excursions: a few examples of how badly things can go

7 — Runway excursions: recognized avoidance procedures

8 — Runway excursions: a few avoidance techniques

9 — One last story: an exercise in self-critique

There I was . . .

Back in 2003, I was sitting in the right seat of a Challenger 604 with my boss in the left seat. It was my first trip with the new company. The boss had a few decades experience in older Challengers and a lot of experience flying out of San Francisco International Airport (KSFO), California. I had more experience in the new Challenger but less flying out of KSFO. This was years before the airport added taxiways north of the runways to allow business jets to get to Runways 1L and 1R without having to cross the Runways 28L and 28R. The normal taxi instruction from the FBO (General Aviation on the chart) to Runway 1L was to cross the 28L and 28R at K, D, or E, left on B and then M or A to 1L or 1R. I knew that much.

I was busy with the checklist when the boss got our taxi clearance to speed things up and he started moving just as I finished the engine start checklist and had to race to begin the taxi checklist. I didn't hear the taxi clearance but the boss assured me we got it. "What was it?" I asked. "Taxi to One Right via Charlie, Lima." This was in the morning and the winds were putting everyone on Runway 1L or 1R. "That can't be right," I said. "It is," he said.

He kept going. "Let me verify," I said. "I know what I heard," he said. "There are aircraft landing and taking off on one!" I said. "I know what I'm doing," he said. But I noticed he was slowing down to look down the runway. There were no aircraft on the runway. Our nose was beyond Taxiway Echo and the next crossing pavement was Runway 1L.

"Challenger 604 Bravo, stop immediately!" Ground control barked at us.

I was able to beg forgiveness, accepted a 180 turn and instructions to hold our position on Echo short of the runway, "until we decide what to do with you."

"I guess we screwed up," the boss said, emphasizing the "we" word.

"We did," I agreed. Fortunately, there was no traffic conflict and tower agreed to let us proceed with nothing more than a verbal rebuke on frequency.

Lessons learned

I am ashamed to say I knew each of the lessons learned here before the incident but allowed the fact I was the new guy with the new boss to turn my normally assertive nature into meekness. The lion becomes a lamb.

• Pilots should familiarize themselves with the airfield diagram and hypothesize the most logical taxi routes, so as to be able to question routes that don't make intuitive sense.
• Both pilots need to hear all clearances which involve aircraft movement.
• When either pilot is in doubt, stop before crossing any taxiway or runway and ask the controlling agency.
• Both pilots should look upon taxiing as a team sport, it is unacceptable for one pilot to bully the other into shutting up and for one pilot to sit meekly quiet when there is any doubt.

The worst of the worst

A few close calls in 2023

More fatalities in 2024

A common factor in many runway incursions in crews with more than one pilot is that both pilots were not "in the loop" or one pilot's force of personality overwhelmed the other's. A good way to resolve this is to require a unanimous vote from both pilots whenever a new taxiway, runway, or ramp is crossed.

Situational awareness via the radio

I've found it helpful at foreign airports to listen in on the ground control frequency at least thirty minutes before departure time to get a feel for the local pronunciation, pacing, and taxi instructions. I do the same at very busy U.S. airports. Most of my operations manuals over the years required we pilots be in the seat and ready at least 30 minutes early. That is a great opportunity to increase your ground situational awareness.

Situational awareness via ADS-B In

If you have ADS-B In, you have a great tool for accurately scanning for traffic down the length of a runway and on final approach prior to entering a runway. On some aircraft you will have to turn this capability on if it doesn't default to on.

In the example photo taken from a Gulfstream GVII in Los Cabos International Airport (MMSD), Mexico, we not only see three aircraft on the ground but another on final approach.

If your aircraft doesn't have ADS-B In, you can get a similar display from ForeFlight in the "Layers" selection.

Prebrief before engine start

A standard practice for many flight crews is to brief the departure while taxiing and that has at least three problems. First, it is a distraction from safely operating the aircraft on the ground. Second, it robs you of listening time to the ground frequency where another's aircraft's instructions or requests can impact you. Third, it is too late to increase your situational awareness of the taxi route itself. I recommend you complete your takeoff and departure briefings just prior to engine start and that you include your anticipated taxi route in that briefing. Brief only changes to the plan once you've started moving.

Pointing and calling

As you are taxiing, the pilot doing the taxi should physically point to all taxiway and runway signs and announce his or her intentions with enough time for the other pilot to agree or disagree. For example:

"I see the Taxiway Bravo," (while pointing to the Taxiway Bravo sign), "I will be making a right turn."

"Agreed." (After crosschecking the taxi instructions and confirming the taxiway sign.)

I adopted this "Pointing and Calling" technique about ten years ago and it has saved me many times. Remember you need to do this after landing as well. More about this: Pointing and Calling.

Delaying the takeoff checklist

Unless your takeoff checklist is onerously long — and if it is, you should consider shortening it — you should delay it until you have been cleared for takeoff or to line up and wait. Completing the final checklist before you are cleared to go puts us mentally in the "go mode" when we may not be actually cleared to go.

Runway identification and verification

Before entering the departure runway, both pilots should identify the runway signage or pavement number and call out what they see.

"I see Runway 28."

"I agree, this is Runway 28."

Once lined up, both pilots should verify the aircraft's heading agrees with the runway's published magnetic heading. "Heading now 283, agrees with the chart."

Include taxi routes as a part of the approach briefing

No approach briefing is complete unless it includes all aircraft movement until the aircraft is in the parking spot and engines are shut down. If you are unsure of how you will be routed on the ground, you should cover your best guess and alternative options.

I took this photo from the right seat of a KC-135A tanker in 1980. I was an Air Force second lieutenant and the copilot. We had on board the crew and our crew chiefs. We were there to support bombers and fighters for the next month. It was my first trip in the Pacific and the idea of landing at Anderson Air Base in Guam was novel enough I just had to take the photo. If it appears the runways end at the water, that is almost true. The runways end at a cliff, which drops 500 feet to the water. That thought would cross my mind just about every time I landed there.

The KC-135A was as old as I was and a common practice was to make all performance numbers 2% more conservative. We would take the landing distance in our manuals, for example, and routinely add 2% because the aircraft was old. It always seemed to work out.

Five years later, I was in the left seat of an EC-135J flying into the same airport and the same runway. I was an Air Force captain and the aircraft commander. We had on board the crew, a deputy to the U.S. Secretary of State and his staff. It was the first leg of a two-week trip that would cover much of Southeast Asia. The island was being drenched by rain and my options were to land or hold. We figured out landing distance for the torrential rainfall and decided it would take 10,500 feet to stop the airplane, which meant we had about 500 feet to spare. I decided to land.

The EC-135J was ten years younger than the old tanker, had larger engines, larger wings, and weighed about 50,000 lbs. more. We did not fudge our performance numbers by 2% because it seemed the charts were accurate. That thought crossed my mind as I felt the anti-skid cycling beneath my feet. These brakes would kick at you and it was unnerving. I brought the airplane to a complete stop on the runway with about 500 feet to spare. The copilot, engineer, and navigator moved on to the after landing checklist and I quietly contemplated those 500 feet. Not the 500 feet extra runway, but the 500 feet from the runway, down the cliff, and to the ocean. The thought has haunted me ever since.

Lessons learned

We often hear our performance numbers are padded by 50% because the engineers don't want to be blamed for "engineering tolerances" or some other lame excuse. Speaking as an engineer, I can tell you the 50% pad is a lie. But our aircraft manufacturers are required to use safety factors and you will often find you and your aircraft perform better than your manuals predict. That is good, for the obvious reason. But it is bad in that it may encourage you to believe the performance numbers can be ignored.

About ten years after my "almost" runway excursion, the Air Force discovered that the method they had been using to measure runway friction was wildly optimistic and most of our takeoff and performance numbers were wrong on everything except a dry runway. For every aircraft I've flown since, I've added a 1,000 foot safety factor on top the performance numbers when it comes to takeoff and landing distances. You could argue that I am giving up a lot of performance and I would agree. But I am willing to do that because a 500' cliff continues to haunt me.

Landing short

Aiming for the first inch of the runway might seem like a good way to avoid not stopping within the confines of that runway. But most of the airplane is behind you and will contact the runway well behind your aim point if you don't perform the flare maneuver perfectly, or even if you do under some circumstances. The crew of Global Express C-GXPR destroyed a practically new aircraft when their tried and true techniques in one aircraft failed in another. More about this: BD-700 C-GXPR.

Wrong runway takeoff

Finding the correct runway at night can be a challenge, even if you are well practiced at the airport in question. It becomes more of a challenge when the taxi routes change. More about this: Comair 5191.

Wrong takeoff procedure

Many of us carry over procedures from earlier aircraft to our new aircraft and some of our earliest habits carry over for our entire careers. Unloading the nose gear during takeoff — the "soft field" technique — is a recipe for disaster in a jet, as this Gulfstream crew found out the hard way. More about this: Gulfstream GIV N23AC.

When things go wrong before landing

There may come a time for you when you think you understand your aircraft so well that a malfunction or two will not phase you or your landing plans. But sometimes your understanding of a malfunction doesn't encompass all the possible complications and you may end up without brakes or other stopping devices. The right answer, often, is to take it around and think things through. More about this: Gulfstream G550 N535GA.

Unstable approach

Many airports are famous for the sheer volume of traffic they handle and pilots can become very good at "give me your best forward speed" and the proverbial "slam dunk" approach. With each successful rushed approach we learn to expand the envelope of what constitutes a "good enough but not stable approach." Reading these case studies can cause you to wonder about the sanity of the pilots willing to fly these unstable approaches. But it may be a better exercise to place yourself in their shoes and think about what you would have done, step by step. More about this: Southwest Airlines 1455.

Wrong landing procedure

A captain with tens of thousands of hours in one aircraft type may not necessarily be the right person to land an airplane of another type. If you've wondered why many business jet operators are reluctant to hire retired airline captains, this case study might shed some light. More about this: Gulfstream GIV N823GA.

The recognized procedures given in the previous section and other sources highlight the need to carefully consider aircraft performance, staying on centerline, and recognizing runway distance remaining cues. But even pilots who do all that seem to end up off the runway surface. Why? I think it all boils down to our internal complacency that tells us we "saved it" when things were out of tolerance before, and we can save it again. Sure, we know we need to land in the touchdown zone, but in the few times when we exceeded that by a thousand feet, nothing went wrong. I have been as guilty as others in accepting long touchdowns, veering slightly left or right of centerline, and underestimating the stopping distance required in some situations or failing to consider stopping distances at all. And in all these years I've never found myself off a runway. That creates in all of us the tendency to think we can "save it" the next time we are outside our established limits. So what's to be done about this?

Aircraft performance

Compute aircraft takeoff and landing distances for every takeoff and landing, no exceptions. If your aircraft doesn't do this for you automatically, it may be helpful to have a table printed with common situations for easy reference.

Runway centerline tolerances

During takeoff and landing, crosswinds and other factors can push the aircraft left or right and in an attempt to be smooth, we can find ourselves well left or right of centerline. But on a 150' wide runway, how much off centerline is too much? If, for example, you are 50' left of centerline in that situation, you still have 25' to spare. It is easy to talk yourself into, "good enough!" in the heat of battle.

What is the legal tolerance? Unless your company manuals specify, there really isn't one. If you are flying a multi-engine aircraft certified under Part 25, the manufacturer establishes V_MCG, minimum control speed with the critical engine inoperative, so that centerline deviation does not exceed 30 feet. More about this: V_MCG.

You should weigh these factors and establish your own tolerances and then stick to them. In my flight department, the tolerance is the distance between the main landing gear, which is 14' in a Gulfstream GVII. So if we deviate so far that either main gear is on the wrong side of centerline, we should call for an abort if below 80 knots. Above 80 knots we continue the takeoff and critique it afterwards. (More on that below.)

Runway takeoff line up tolerances

Your aircraft performance should have a line up distance used for takeoff performance calculations. If not, you should establish a number and add that to the takeoff distance required. In either case, you should also compute what your actual line up distance is for a normal "rolling" takeoff. Part of your takeoff performance briefing should include these numbers and the need to adjust techniques when required. For example: "Today's balanced field is within 1,000 feet of runway distance, so we will need to modify our usual rolling takeoff to static procedures using a tight turn at the runway's end and application of takeoff thrust prior to brake release."

Even if takeoff performance isn't critical, you should note how much runway you have consumed prior to application of takeoff thrust. You can use this to grade yourself and to consider the need to adjust what you allow for a rolling takeoff.

Runway touchdown zone tolerances

I've flown for operations where the criteria for an acceptable landing was: (1) touchdown in the first third of the runway, (2) the established touchdown zone of the runway, or (3) where there was no criteria at all. The problem with the first set of rules is that your performance data doesn't account for that and you might not remember that fact as you are skimming those extra hundreds (or thousands) of feet. The problem with the second method is that you might actually be better off landing a few hundred feet beyond the touchdown zone than attempting a balked landing. The problem with the third method is self evident. So what can we do about this?

The first step in avoiding long landings is to deemphasize the soft touchdown and applaud landings that are on speed, on centerline, and in the touchdown zone. We do this in the critique, discussed below.

The next step is to empower the "go around" call whenever a landing becomes questionable. I know this requires judgment and that may seem contrary to the ideas I've put forth to this point. But a rule that requires a go around no matter the situation is less likely to be enforced.

"Go around" call out

Unless you are in the business of training brand new first officers, you should entrust in your first officers the power to call "go around" when they deem it prudent to do so. Go around in the moment and discuss why after you are on the ground. You should, as a flight department, fully discuss when a go around is appropriate and the idea it is a "no fault" call. Even if it was a mistake to go around, you learn from the exercise.

A common complaint against the "when in doubt, take it around" philosophy is that there may be a time when going around is the worst possible option. If that is the case, you should brief that. For example: "We've had a couple of tries at the approach here and we don't have any other viable alternates. The book says it takes 500 lbs. to go around and make another approach and we have less than that. We will be landing on this approach and going around is not an option."

Critique: grading your performance publicly

You have probably heard much of what I've said here and are wondering if, in the heat of battle, you will be able to abort a takeoff when continuing will probably work out. You may wonder about telling the Pilot Flying (PF) to correct to centerline after touchdown when you have plenty of runway and the offending pilot is the guy who signs your paycheck. As the boss in my last few operations, I sometimes wondered why the Pilot Monitoring (PM) didn't give me the corrections our SOPs demanded. All that changed when we incorporated the "What's the DEAL" post-flight briefing. More about that: Pre-briefs and Post-briefs. The most important part of the post-flight briefing is the critique.

The PF self-critiques all areas of the flight where his or her performance fell short of Standard Operating Procedures, including the runway excursion topics covered in this article. For example: "I got a little sloppy during takeoff and drifted left of centerline. The aircraft weather-vaned a bit and I need to be more aggressive with the rudder. By the time we got to 80 knots I had the correction started so it made sense to continue. But I need to do better in the future." Why mention it at all? This way the PM knows that you were aware and doesn't need to say anything. More importantly, this way you publicly acknowledge your fall from whatever lofty pedestal you were on and you will subconsciously remember to do better the next time. All this is well and good, but what if you, the PF, didn't catch the problem?

The PM should diplomatically ask about any problems not mentioned by the PF. Phrase these as questions to give the PF a chance to self-critique. For example:

• PM: "The landing felt a little long to me, but we were on speed and on centerline, and I guess I lost track of the fixed distance markers. How did it feel to you?"
• PF: "Now that you mention it, I think you are right. I really thought the airplane was going to settle right on the fixed distance markers and was surprised it didn't. So I relaxed back pressure and felt the wheels touch just as we passed the 2,000' markers. Not bad, but could certainly be better. I'll work on that!"

Note: these self critiques will only work if the senior pilots freely participate. If you are the boss, you need to critique yourself mercilessly. This will telegraph to the "troops" that you are serious about the process. You must also receive all critiques cheerfully. More about this below.

One last story, but first a preface. I very rarely land long. From an early age as an Air Force pilot, any tendency to land long was beaten out of me. I have more of a problem landing on centerline. I can go several years without a problem, but out of nowhere, that tendency comes back, usually to the left. So, on with the story.

"Landing long . . ."

About 15 years ago, my flight department bought a new airplane, a Gulfstream G450. We had been flying an older Gulfstream GIV. Everyone was well schooled on the GIV and everyone in the flight department had more experience in the jet than me. But I was in charge. We had already adopted the idea that anyone in the cockpit could critique themselves or the boss, things just had to be done politely. When we bought the G450, I went from the least experienced to the most experienced, having already been type rated.

The G450 was multiple generations ahead of the GIV and as is to be expected, it took months for the new pilots to catch up with the jet. "Hey, did you ever notice there are mile markers before the synthetic runway?" one of them said after finally noticing it. But that is normal, your brain takes a while to soak it all in. So there we were: I was landing the airplane and "S" was in the right seat. It was a beautiful, sunny day, the auto throttles were fully retarded and I was in the middle of the flare when "S" said, "you are going high, long landing." This surprised me, but I unceremoniously forced the airplane onto the runway. After the flight he critiqued me for drifting high in the flare and I thanked him for spotting this.

This happened again with the same result. For the third time I also put the airplane down but as I did so I pointed out the runway markings just ahead of us. During the critique I asked him what he saw and he said it was the 1,000' fixed distance markers. "So if the 1,000' markers were ahead of us, where do you think we touched down?" I asked. "Short of that," he acknowledged. "So why did you think we were landing long?" "Because the glide slope needle shot below us all of a sudden." "Where is the glide slope antenna located along the runway?" It was only then that he realized that is what the glide slope needle does when you pass it. As you approach, on glide slope, it is centered. But as you fly beyond it, it shoots downward. He apologized. "No worries, better that you spoke up."

"Left of centerline . . ."

Two months later, on the same runway with me flying and "S" in the right seat, he said "you are drifting left of centerline." It wasn't much, but it was true. During the critique I thanked him again and I reminded myself for the next few landings: "Centerline!"

"Lesson learned . . ."

Our pilot "S" talks about this now and then when teaching Crew Resource Management. "If the boss bit my head off when I was wrong, do you think I would have been willing to speak up again when he was wrong?" And that is key. If you want to train yourself from doing all those things that lead to runway incursions and excursions, you have to critique yourself often, invite others to critique you, and you have to take those lessons to heart.

Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Tool Kit Briefing Note 8.1, Runway Excursions.

Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA-H-8083-25B, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 2016.